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Hvorfor hadde russerne våpen mot slutten av det mongolske åket, men ikke mongolene?

Hvorfor hadde russerne våpen mot slutten av det mongolske åket, men ikke mongolene?


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Russiske soldater brukte først skytevåpen i 1382 mot mongolene (det er ikke nevnt i artikkelen om mongolene også hadde våpen). Dette ville vise seg å være en utilstrekkelig fordel på den tiden, men et århundre senere bidro skytevåpnene til å sikre seier og bryte mongolsk makt i Vesten - ifølge muscovittiske krøniker hadde mongolene ingen våpen under Great Stand, noe som bidro til deres retrett.

I følge dette svaret kom imidlertid kruttet til Europa gjennom mongolene, eller gjennom silkeveien (hvorav mongolene kontrollerte store deler), som stammer fra Kina (som mongolene kontrollerte). Mongolene brukte til og med kruttvåpen i invasjonen av Korea, og brukte raketter mot magyarene i 1241.

Hvorfor da, mange år senere, mistet mongolene tilgangen til skytevåpen og kruttvåpen, mens emnet russerne fikk dem?


Spørsmål: Hvorfor mistet mongolene mange år senere (under den store standen 1480) tilgangen til skytevåpen og kruttvåpen, mens emnet russerne fikk dem?

Jeg tror ikke å miste tilgang er den riktige måten å tenke på det. Mongolene brukte krutt kreativt i lang tid før Great Stand. De var erfarne i å kjempe med det og mot kruttvåpen som går tilbake til 1200 -tallets lange krig med Kina. Men denne opplevelsen var ikke nødvendigvis med brannvåpen. De brukte pilbomber, flammekastere, raketter, katapultspredte skrapmetallbomber og til og med råartilleri. De brukte flere beleiringsvåpen som kunne brukes i forbindelse med basepakken som var hest og baug.

Så hvorfor utviklet/eksperimenterte ikke mongolene (tatarene) mer med ildvåpen?

  1. Mongolene var raske til å se fordelene med andres teknologi og kopiere den; Det var imidlertid ikke de som skulle innovere ny teknologi. I krigen med Kina var det kineserne å innovere, og mongolene som kopierte. Teknologien til Song -dynastiet i Kina

  2. Mongolene/tartarhæren var basert på bueskyttere og hesterygger. En mongolsk bue hadde angivelig en rekkevidde på 500 meter (548 meter eller 0,3 miles). 15. århundre skytevåpen slet med å skyte 50-75 meter. Og baugen kunne brukes fra hesteryggen med en mye høyere brannhastighet enn primitive ildvåpen også med mye mer nøyaktighet. Selv om mongolene hadde sett primitive ildvåpen, ville det være lett å forestille seg at de ville avvise dem som dårligere enn buen. Bowen var inngrodd i kulturen deres, så det ville være lett å forstå deres skjevhet gitt alle fordelene med Bowen.

  3. Det var ikke bare brannarmen på stativet som fikk mongolene/tartarene. Det var masseskudd som alle avfyrte på det samme sakte bevegelige målet. Det er den eneste måten ikke -riflede tidlige flintlåser var effektive. Volley Fire. Russerne brukte elven til å bremse tartarene. Denne massen av infanteri som forsvarte med ildvåpen ville ha vært en slags blind flekk for mongolene som angrep på hesteryggen var basert på hastighet og ikke var organisert rundt massert infanteri som de vanligvis ødela.

  4. De primitive skytevåpnene kunne ikke brukes fra hesteryggen. Kunne ikke sparkes veldig nøyaktig fra hesteryggen. Kan ikke lastes om fra hesteryggen. Brannen kunne ikke konsentreres av tropper på hesteryggen.

Kanskje en annen måte å se dette spørsmålet på er hvorfor ikke russerne brukte buer på standen i 1480. Dette er sannsynligvis fordi buemenn var langt vanskeligere å trene. Det tok et helt liv å trene en baugmann. Dette var ikke et problem for mongolene som lærte bue ferdigheter fra fødselen, både gutt og jente mongolske barn. For russerne ville de ikke ha tid til å trene buemenn til et forestående engasjement.

Jeg vil også argumentere Stand, med den russiske forsvarslinjen langs Ugra -elven var skreddersydd for brannvåpen. Infanteriet med ildvåpnene kunne massere seg på den ene kysten uten frykt for at Mongol -golgata i rask bevegelse skulle falle på dem. Mongolene måtte krysse elven, skulle både grupperes og bremses. Sakte beveger seg nært i mål som ble skutt på fra defensive tropper som hadde evnen til å bli forankret. 4 dager med det. Russerne hadde en god plan, og valgte det perfekte våpenet for det.

Når det gjelder mongoler mot tartarer. Tatarene var i hovedsak mongoler. Det er akkurat det europeere kalte mongolene. De samme gruppene nomadiske mennesker som vi kjenner som tatarene kjempet med Djengis Khans hær i Kina på 1200 -tallet. Ja tartarene på stativet var to århundrer og tusenvis av mil fjernet fra Djengis Khan, men de ble fremdeles ledet av en khan, fremdeles organisert i en Horde, brukte fremdeles hest og mongolske bueformasjoner; og viktigst var direkte nedstammet fra de kombinerte folkene som kjempet mot Kina på 1200 -tallet.

The Golden Horde
Etter hvert som forskjellige nomadiske grupper ble en del av Djengis Khans hær på begynnelsen av 1200 -tallet, fant en sammensmeltning av mongolske og tyrkiske elementer sted, og inntrengerne av Rus og det pannoniske bassenget ble kjent for europeerne som tatarer eller tartarer (se tatarisk åk). Etter oppbruddet av det mongolske riket ble tatarene spesielt identifisert med den vestlige delen av imperiet, kjent som Golden Horde.

Hoved kilde:
Teknologien til Song -dynastiet i Kina
Den mongolske bue
Wiki: Flott stand ved Ugra -elven
Stand Off
Wiki: Tartarene.
Wiki: Wings of the Golden Horde
Tidlige brannvåpen
Wiki: Volley Fire


Først og fremst er jeg enig i Semaphores første kommentar: det er usannsynlig at skytevåpen i 1480 kunne gjøre stor forskjell. For det andre var ikke motstanderen til russerne i 1480 mongoler. De ble kalt tatarer, og de var fjerne etterkommere av det opprinnelige mongolske imperiet. Teknologien til mongoler på 1200 -tallet var basert på kinesisk teknologi. På 1400 -tallet hadde tatarer som kjempet med russerne liten forbindelse med Kina, og hvis det er noen forbindelse mellom dem og de opprinnelige mongolene, er det stort sett historisk. Og hvem kan med sikkerhet fortelle at tatarer ikke hadde skytevåpen i 1480?

Med alt dette gjenstår et bredere spørsmål. Det er en vanlig oppfatning av historikere at krutt, skytevåpen og raketter ble oppfunnet i Kina. Hvor forsvant alt dette? Da europeerne kom i direkte kontakt med Kina og andre land i Østen, nevner de knapt kinesisk artilleri og raketter. Sannsynligvis var de ikke så imponerende, selv om de eksisterte.

Det som eksisterte fra eldre tider var sannsynligvis ikke veldig effektivt, og det utviklet seg ikke. Man kan spørre hvorfor det ikke utviklet seg, men kanskje et mer rimelig spørsmål ville være hvorfor alt utviklet seg så raskt i Europa.

REDIGERE. Regresjon i teknologi skjer faktisk, og det er mange eksempler. "Gresk ild" var et skremmende våpen hvis vi tror på samtidens beskrivelser, men vi hører ingenting om det når tyrkerne beleiret Konstantinopel. Det er tapt, og vi vet ikke engang hva det var. La meg også nevne den enorme tilbakegangen innen teknologi som skjedde i Europa på slutten av antikken. Middelaldersk (vår) artilleri var dårligere enn hellenistisk artilleri. Romerske krigsskip var (sannsynligvis) dårligere enn hellenistiske krigsskip (hvis vi tror deres samtidige beskrivelser). Men det skjedde også andre tider og steder.


Problemet er ikke at russiske "kanoner" ga dem fordelen fremfor mongolene (eller tartarene). Problemet er at russiske våpen utlignet dem med mongolske buemenn.

Mongolene (og engelskmennene) var i stand til å stille hærer med 60% bowmen fordi disse bowmen ble utsatt for "kontinuerlig" praksis over en periode på år. Ingen andre middelalderske hærer trente så store prosentandeler, eller til og med et stort absolutt antall menn som kunne bruke missilvåpen.

Våpen, i motsetning til buer, var noe "gjennomsnittlige" soldater kunne lære å skyte i løpet av dager eller uker. Nå kunne russerne også bevæpne troppene sine med "rekkevidde" -våpen. Dette nøytraliserte i sin tur farten til de mongolske hestene.

Fordi de kjempet på hjemmebanen og likte et større antall, likte russerne "uavgjort odds" (uavgjort teller som en seier).

Sagt på en annen måte, "kanoner" representerte høyst en liten oppgradering over eksisterende mongolske våpen, men det representerte en enorm oppgradering over russiske sverd og spyd, noe som ga dem den "likheten" de trengte for å slå mongolene, gitt overlegne tall.


Svaret på dette spørsmålet ligger i en kombinasjon av to ting: et visst spesifisitetsnivå (dvs. detaljer) og, ved en enkel hendelse, hvorfor rusen hadde våpen mens (Tandsten) -Mongolene gjorde det ikke.

Om detaljer: Spesielt er spørsmålet på våpen (ikke brannbomber, brannlanser osv.) og Flott Horde (ikke Golden Horde).

På tidspunkt: Standoff ved Ugra River i 1480.

Jeg skal prøve å svare på dette: "Hvorfor da, mange år senere, mistet mongolene tilgangen til skytevåpen og kruttvåpen, mens emnet russerne fikk dem?"(siste setning av OP).


Utvikling av Modern Gun

For det første moderne pistol ble utviklet spesielt rundt denne perioden, slutten av 1400-tallet:

Det klassiske håndholdte skytevåpen dukket opp i Europa på samme tid som klassisk artilleri gjorde - i de siste tiårene av det femtende århundre. I illustrerte krøniker fra 1480 -årene skyter soldater med våpen som ser gjenkjennelig moderne ut (figur 12.1). De har lange, tynne tønner, og de holdes nær kinnet, et øye kikker nedover fatet for å sikte. Selv om det ikke er klart i figur 12.1, hadde disse skytevåpnene en spakmekanisme som gjorde at en brennende sikring kunne senkes ned i blitsen ved hjelp av en enkel bevegelse av fingeren. Denne mekanismen, kjent som en fyrstikklås, var et betydelig fremskritt fordi den gjorde det mulig for en soldat å holde pistolen i øyehøyde. Med rumpa hvilende mot skulderen, kunne han stanse pistolen med den ene hånden og skyte med den andre. I de følgende tiårene fikk triggermekanismer fjærer og andre forbedringer, og pistolene ble enda mer praktiske.

Etter å ha oppnådd denne klassiske formen begynte skytevåpen å vises mer regelmessig på europeiske slagmarker. På 1480 -tallet var skyttere fremdeles stort sett i undertall av buemenn, sverdmenn og pikemen, men antallet økte jevnt og trutt. Spanske opptegnelser viser at andelen matchlock-enheter til armbrøst- og bue- og pilenheter økte betydelig på slutten av 1480-tallet og begynnelsen av 1490-årene, en prosess drevet av den konstante eksperimenteringen av Granada-krigene (1481-1492). Spanske skyttere brakte sine nye teknikker til Italia under de ødeleggende krigene som startet i 1494, til avgjørende effekt, som i det berømte slaget ved Cerignola 1503. Deretter ble arquebusiers stadig mer fremtredende i Europa, slik at de på slutten av 1500 -tallet hadde blitt en kjernekomponent i europeiske hærer og nådde andeler på 40 prosent av infanteristyrker.

Kilde: Andrade, Tonio (2016), Kruttalderen: Kina, militær innovasjon og vestens oppgang i verdenshistorien, Princeton University Press, s.167.

En enklere måte å si dette på, Wikipedia's tidslinje på kruttalderen angir det tydelig, "(i) 1480 ... Våpen når sin klassiske form i Europa". Herfra kan vi anta Ivan den store importerte dem for sin hær.


Tillat meg å komme meg unna og påpeke, med særlig fokus på Ivans fiender ved Ugra-elven i 1480, den såkalte Mongoler... igjen er detaljene viktige. Det riktige begrepet skal være Tartar-mongoler (også kjent som Flott Horde, og ikke å forveksle med Golden Horde of Jochids). Viktigheten av dette skillet vil bli forklart om et øyeblikk.


Midt på 1400-tallet: Våpen fra Europa, ikke Kina

For det andre, et sentralt element i spørsmålet "... (hvorfor) mistet tartar-mongolene tilgang til skytevåpen ...?" Det korte svaret er, de hadde det aldri i utgangspunktet, fordi kanoner (selve instrumentet, ikke krutt) ble utviklet i Kina og Europa, og det ble dramatisk forbedret i sistnevnte (Europa) i midten av 1400-tallet (noen tiår like før avstanden ved Ugra-elven):

Faktisk utviklet våpen i Kina seg langs en lignende trend som i Europa, og vokste lenger i forhold til neseboringen. Men utviklingen bremset i Kina omtrent en generasjon før utviklingen i Europa av den klassiske kanonen. Hvorfor? Årsaken har sannsynligvis mindre å gjøre med å gjøre noen antatt kulturell oppfinnsomhet fra europeerne enn med frekvensen av krigføring. Etter 1449 gikk Kina inn i en periode med relativ fred, mens Europa gikk inn i en periode med vedvarende, intens, eksistensiell krigføring. Med eksistensiell krigføring mener jeg konflikt som truet selve eksistensen til de involverte statene. Kinesiske kanoner hadde utviklet seg raskt mellom slutten av 1200 -tallet, da de første sanne kanonene ser ut til å ha dukket opp, og begynnelsen av 1400 -årene, en periode der Kina ble ødelagt av eksistensiell krigføring. Århundret fra 1350 eller så til 1449 var spesielt turbulent, ettersom Ming forsøkte å etablere og konsolidere imperiet sitt, og i løpet av denne tiden ser det ut til at utviklingen av våpen mot lengre fat har gått på ganske like linjer i Kina og Vesten . På midten av 1400 -tallet stoppet denne utviklingen i Kina og akselererte i Europa, nettopp da krigføringen gikk ned i Kina økte i Europa.

Kilde: ibid., s.105.


Great Horde (ikke-Chinggisid, derfor ingen støtte fra andre mongoler)

Til slutt kommer det viktige skillet mellom Great Horde, i motsetning til Golden Horde, til dette: Great Horde var bare en av mange forskjellige 'horder'etter oppløsningen av Golden Horde på slutten av 1300-tallet. Viktigst, det var de ikke relatert til Djengis Khan (dvs. ikke-Chinggisid).

Et kort avsnitt om de mange påfølgende horder (eller khanater), post-Golden Horde:

Med Toqtamishble styrtet i 1395, en ny klan, the Manghit (se sitat nedenfor), under ikke-Chinggisid-sjef i sjef Edigü (d. 1420), dukket opp mellom Volga og Emba. Edigü opprettholdt noe av Horde -enheten til 1411, men innen 1425 ble det innført uavhengige regimer over hele Golden Horde -territoriet. Khanates of Blue Horde hevdet seg formelt på Krim (1449), Kazan (eller Bulghar al-Jedid "New Bulghar", 1445) og Kasimov (1453). Krim-khanatet spredte til slutt "Great Horde" (Ulugh Orda), sammensatt av den høyre klanen Sanchi'ud (tyrkisk Sijuvut), i 1503.

Kilde: Christopher P. Atwood, "Encyclopedia of Mongolia og det mongolske riket"NY: Facts On File, Inc, 2004, s.208.

De Mangghud, Manghud (Mongolsk: Мангуд, Mangud) var en mongolsk stamme i Urud-Manghud-føderasjonen. De etablerte Nogai Horde på 1300 -tallet og Manghit -dynastiet for å styre Emiratet Bukhara i 1785. De tok den islamske tittelen Emir i stedet for tittelen Khan siden de ikke var etterkommere av Djengis Khan og heller baserte sin legitimitet for å styre på islam.

Kilde: Wikipedia

For å avslutte, selv om de østasiatiske mongolene ønsket å hjelpe til med å skaffe våpen til Great Horde, ville det ha vært en strekk rett og slett fordi Kina på dette stadiet ikke lenger var under Yuan -dynastiet, hadde flyttet til Ming (1368-1644).


Her er et teknologibasert svar. Jeg innrømmer at jeg ikke kjenner den historiske årsaken til at russerne brukte våpen og tatarene ikke gjorde det, men jeg kan gi grunner til at det ville være mye mer fornuftig for russerne å bruke dem enn tatarene.

Våpen, før den utbredte adopsjonen av flintlås på slutten av 1600 -tallet, var nær ubrukelig i hendene på kavaleri.

Våpen før 1500- til 1600-tallet kunne ikke bare tas ut av et hylster eller en sekk og skutt mot fienden. De hadde ingen grunningsmekanisme. Du måtte tenne dem med et brennende taustykke kalt en fyrstikkledning. Ta en titt på matchlock musketter: Selv om pistolen allerede var lastet, måtte du sette fyrstikkledningen inn i slangen, justere plasseringen av den brennende fyrstikken slik at den skulle slå i pannen (etter hvert som den brant, ble den kortere slik at du hadde for å fortsette å justere den på nytt), åpne deretter pannen og blås deretter på den ulmende fyrstikkledningen for å få den til å lyse, og først da kan du trekke i avtrekkeren.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2KTS8PQ06Qo

Og hvis vi snakker om enda tidligere tider, som 1300- og 1400 -tallet, var det enda verre, fordi du ikke engang hadde en utløser: du hadde pistolen i den ene hånden, brennende fyrstikkord i den andre hånden, og du rørte ved tilpasses tenningshullet manuelt. Lykke til med det mens du rir på hest! (Selv til fots var det nesten umulig å sikte mens du holdt pistolen i den ene hånden og fyrstikkledningen i den andre, så ofte ble to menn brukt, den ene for å sikte og den andre for å tenne pistolen) Selv om det skulle lastes på igjen, ville det være plagsomt hesteryggen, hvor ville du lagt det brennende tauet mens du lastet på nytt? Da var det heller ikke lett å tenne, spesielt under galopp. Ofte brant begge ender av fyrstikkledningen, fordi avfyring av pistolen kan slukke enden du brukte.

Infanteriet hadde ingen slike problemer, de kunne til og med hvile musketten på støtter.

Merk: det var våpen optimalisert for kavaleri, hjellåsen. Imidlertid var det et veldig komplisert, dyrt og vedlikeholdskrevende utstyr, egnet for riddere, ikke sånn for stepp nomader. Og det var ikke oppfunnet ennå i vår tidsramme.

Så, for å oppsummere det: våpen i den tidsperioden var bare egnet for infanteri, ikke for kavaleri. Tatarene brukte nesten utelukkende kavaleri. Det er mye lettere for en hær som allerede består hovedsakelig av infanteri å adoptere et våpen som er godt egnet for infanteri, enn for en hær og kultur som hovedsakelig består av ryttere for å forlate hester og bli infanteri.


Avskjedigelsen av Bagdad av Hulagu Khan (og allierte) førte til at mongolene i 1258 førte til en virtuell slutt på Abbasid -kalifatet

Dette innlegget handler om en svært tragisk hendelse i det abbasidiske kalifatet som fører til dets virtuelle slutt. Jeg synes det er viktig å dele informasjon. om det, for å forbedre forståelsen av Asias historie.

Men dette innlegget skal ikke ses på som anti-islam. Jeg vil si at jeg tror på Shirdi Sai Babas lære om "Sabka Maalik Ek" (Mesteren over alt er EN). Med andre ord, jeg tror på EN GUD med forskjellige religioner, inkludert islam som forskjellige veier/måter å tilbe og slå seg sammen i den ENE GUDEN. Nærmere bestemt er jeg ikke imot islam, og støtter det faktisk, så lenge det ikke forstyrrer andres rett (som meg, en hindu) til å praktisere sin tro som er forskjellig fra islam (f.eks. Hinduisme, kristendom, sikhisme) , Jainisme, buddhisme, jødedom),
og forstyrrer heller ikke i retten til noen å ikke ha tro (ateister/agnostikere). Shirdi Sai Baba pleide å si "Allah Maalik" (Allah/Gud er herren) veldig ofte ærbød jeg meg for den samme Shirdi Sai Baba, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sai_Baba_of_Shirdi, og prøver å følge hans lære.

De berømte og store islamske kalifatene, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caliphate, er
1. Rashidun -kalifatet, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rashidun_Caliphate, fra 632 til 661 CE: Legg merke til at profeten Muhammad døde i 632 CE og Rashidun -kalifatet oppsto på den tiden. En nær ledsager av Propet Muhammad, Abu Bakr, ble den første kalifen i Rashidun -kalifatet. Han ble fulgt av Umar, Uthman og deretter Ali. Det var under Alis regjeringstid at det var en arvekrig som endte med utryddelse av Ummayad -kalifatet. Legg merke til at Ali, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali, var fetter og svigersønn til profeten Muhammad. Ali ble myrdet i 661, hvoretter Ummayad -kalifatet dukket opp som det nye kalifatet.

3. Abbasid Kalifat, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abbasid_Caliphate, fra 750 til 1258 CE selv om det fortsatte å kreve religiøs autoritet basert i Egypt fra 1258 til 1517.

Nå for litt info. om Abbasid -kalifatet som utdrag fra wikisiden: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abbasid_Caliphate

Det abbasidiske kalifatet (/ əˈbæsɪd/ eller/ ˈæbəsɪd/ arabisk: ٱل ْ خ ِ لاف َ ة ُ ٱل ْ ع َ ب َ ّ اس ِ ¡& al 166 َ َ av de islamske kalifatene for å etterfølge den islamske profeten Muhammad. Det ble grunnlagt av et dynasti nedstammet fra Muhammeds onkel, Abbas ibn Abdul-Muttalib (566 og#8211653 e.Kr.), som dynastiet har fått sitt navn fra. [2] De regjerte som kalifer for det meste av kalifatet fra hovedstaden i Bagdad i dagens Irak, etter å ha styrtet Umayyad-kalifatet i Abbasid-revolusjonen 750 CE (132 AH).

Abbasid-kalifatet sentrerte først regjeringen i Kufa, dagens Irak, men i 762 grunnla kalifen Al-Mansur byen Bagdad, nær den gamle sasaniske hovedstaden Ctesiphon. Abbasidperioden var preget av avhengighet av persiske byråkrater (særlig Barmakid-familien) for å styre territoriene, samt en økende inkludering av ikke-arabiske muslimer i ummah (nasjonalt samfunn). Persiske skikker ble stort sett adoptert av den herskende eliten, og de begynte beskyttelse av kunstnere og lærde. [3] Bagdad ble et senter for vitenskap, kultur, filosofi og oppfinnelse i det som ble kjent som islams gullalder.
.
Kalifenes politiske makt endte stort sett med fremveksten av de iranske Buyidene og Seljuq -tyrkerne, som fanget Bagdad i henholdsvis 945 og 1055. Selv om abbasidens ledelse over det enorme islamske imperiet gradvis ble redusert til en seremoniell religiøs funksjon, beholdt dynastiet kontrollen over sitt mesopotamiske domene. Abbasidenes periode med kulturell frukt ble avsluttet i 1258 med sekken av Bagdad av mongolene under Hulagu Khan. Den abbasidiske linjalen av herskere og muslimsk kultur generelt, sentrerte seg igjen i den mamlukiske hovedstaden i Kairo i 1261. Selv om dynastiet manglet politisk makt (med det korte unntaket av kalif Al-Musta'in fra Kairo), fortsatte dynastiet å kreve religiøs autoritet til etter den osmanske erobringen av Egypt i 1517. [6]

[Wiki -referanser:]
2. Hoiberg, Dale H., red. (2010). "Abbasid -dynastiet". Encyclopedia Britannica. I: A-Ak – Bayes (15. utg.). Chicago, IL. ISBN 978-1-59339-837-8., S. 10.
3. Canfield, Robert L. (2002). Turko-Persia i historisk perspektiv. Cambridge University Press. s. 5. ISBN 9780521522915.

6. Holt, Peter M. (1984). "Noen observasjoner om 'Abbāsid -kalifatet i Kairo". Bulletin fra School of Oriental and African Studies. University of London. 47 (3): 501 �. doi: 10.1017/s0041977x00113710.
--- avslutte utdrag fra Abbasid-kalifatet wikiside ---

Nå kan vi komme til invasjonen av Bagdad av Hulagu Khan -ledede mongoler og allierte.

Hulagu Khan, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hulagu_Khan, var et barnebarn av Genghiz Khan. Hulagu Khan var underordnet broren Mongke Khan som var Great Khan (Khagan). Legg merke til at Hulagu Khan ikke var muslim og kan ha fulgt mongolsk sjamanreligion, og kona og moren var nestorianske kristne.

Jeg har inkludert informasjon om den fryktelige ødeleggelsen av Bagdad av mongolene (og deres allierte). Jeg tror det er viktig å kjenne denne skrekken som skjedde tidligere som en måte å unngå slike hendelser i fremtiden, uansett hvilket land/rike/by/religion som er involvert.

Folk som foretrekker å ikke lese om slik fryktelig vold, kan hoppe over å lese resten av dette innlegget.

Beleiringen av Bagdad, som varte fra 29. januar til 10. februar 1258, innebar investering, fangst og sekk av Bagdad, hovedstaden i Abbasid -kalifatet, av mongolske styrker og allierte tropper fra Ilkhanate. Mongolene var under kommando av Hulagu Khan (eller Hulegu Khan), bror til khagan Möngke Khan, som hadde til hensikt å ytterligere utvide sitt styre til Mesopotamia, men ikke direkte å styrte kalifatet. Möngke hadde imidlertid instruert Hulagu om å angripe Bagdad hvis kalifen Al-Musta'sim nektet mongolske krav om hans fortsatte underkastelse til khagan og betaling av hyllest i form av militær støtte til mongolske styrker i Persia.

Hulagu begynte sin kampanje i Persia med flere offensiver mot Nizari -grupper, inkludert leiemorderne, som mistet sin høyborg Alamut. Deretter marsjerte han mot Bagdad og krevde at Al-Mustasim skulle tilslutte seg vilkårene Möngke påla abbasidene. Selv om abbasidene ikke hadde klart å forberede seg på invasjonen, mente kalifen at Bagdad ikke kunne falle for invaderende styrker og nektet å overgi seg. Hulagu beleiret deretter byen, som overga seg etter 12 dager. I løpet av den neste uken sparket mongolene Bagdad, begikk mange grusomheter og ødela abbasidernes store biblioteker, inkludert visdomshuset. Mongolene henrettet Al-Musta'sim og massakrerte mange innbyggere i byen, som ble sterkt avfolket. Beleiringen anses å markere slutten på den islamske gullalderen, hvor kalifene hadde utvidet sitt styre fra Den iberiske halvøy til Sindh, og som også var preget av mange kulturelle prestasjoner. [7]

Mange historiske beretninger beskriver grusomhetene til de mongolske erobrerne. Bagdad var en avfolket, ødelagt by i flere århundrer og gjenvunnet bare gradvis noe av sin tidligere herlighet.

Mongolene plyndret og ødela deretter moskeer, palasser, biblioteker og sykehus. Uvurderlige bøker fra Bagdads trettiseks offentlige biblioteker ble revet fra hverandre, plyndrerne brukte skinndekslene som sandaler. [28] Store bygninger som hadde vært i generasjoner, ble brent ned til grunnen. Visdomshuset (det store biblioteket i Bagdad), som inneholdt utallige dyrebare historiske dokumenter og bøker om emner som spenner fra medisin til astronomi, ble ødelagt. Overlevende sa at vannet i Tigris ble svart av blekk fra de enorme mengdene bøker som kastet ut i elven og rødt fra blodet til forskerne og filosofene som ble drept. [29]

Borgere forsøkte å flykte, men ble avlyttet av mongolske soldater som drepte i overflod, og verken sparte kvinner eller barn. Martin Sicker skriver at nærmere 90 000 mennesker kan ha omkommet. [30] Andre estimater går mye høyere. Wassaf hevder tapet av liv var flere hundre tusen. Ian Frazier fra The New Yorker sier estimater av dødstallene har variert fra 200 000 til en million. [31]

Kalifen Al-Musta'sim ble tatt til fange og tvunget til å se på at innbyggerne hans ble myrdet og statskassen hans plyndret. Ifølge de fleste beretninger ble kalifen drept av tråkking. Mongolene rullet kalifen opp i et teppe og red hestene sine over ham, ettersom de trodde at jorden ville bli fornærmet hvis den ble rørt av kongelig blod. Alle unntatt en av Al-Musta'sims sønner ble drept, og den eneste gjenlevende sønnen ble sendt til Mongolia, hvor mongolske historikere rapporterer at han giftet seg og fikk barn, men spilte ingen rolle i islam deretter (se slutten av Abbasid-dynastiet).

Hulagu måtte flytte leiren oppover i byen på grunn av stanken av forfall fra den ødelagte byen.

Historikeren David Morgan har sitert Wassaf som beskriver ødeleggelsen: "De feide gjennom byen som sultne falker som angrep et fly av duer, eller som ulvende ulver som angrep sauer, med løse tøyler og skamløse ansikter, myrdet og spredte terror. Senger og puter laget av gull og kledd i juveler ble kuttet i stykker med kniver og revet i filler. De som gjemte seg bak slørene til den store Harem ble dratt. gjennom gatene og smugene, hver av dem ble et leketøy. mens befolkningen døde av hendene på inntrengere. "[32]

[Wiki -referanser]
7. Matthew E. Falagas, Effie A. Zarkadoulia, George Samonis (2006). "Arabisk vitenskap i gullalderen (750 og#82111258 CE) og i dag", The FASEB Journal 20, s. 1581 �.
.
28. Murray, S.A.P. (2012). Biblioteket: En illustrert historie. New York: Skyhorse Publishing, s. 54.
29. Frazier, I., "Invaders: Destroying Baghdad," New Yorker Magazine, [Spesialutgave: Annals of History], 25. april 2005, Onlineutgave arkivert 2018-06-12 på Wayback Machine
30. (sykere 2000, s. 111)
31. Frazier, Ian (25. april 2005). "Historiens annaler: Invaders: Destroying Baghdad". New Yorker. s. 4. Arkivert fra originalen 2017-10-10. Hentet 2012-01-01.
32. Marozzi, Justin (29. mai 2014). Bagdad: City of Peace, City of Blood. Penguin Books. s. 176 �. ISBN 978-0-14-194804-1.

--- avslutte ekstrakter fra beleiringen av Bagdad wikiside:

En engelsk oversettelse av det som skal være brevet fra Hulagu Khan til Kalifen i Bagdad (tekstversjon): https://www.quora.com/Where-can-I-find-the-translated-letter-that- Hulagu-Khan-skrev-til-kalifen-i-Bagdad.

En lydversjon av det samme: Et brev fra Hulagu Khan til Kalifen i Bagdad, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RC2q6O4ZVgA, 2 min. 54 sekunder.

Mine bønner til Gud om at slike fryktelige ødeleggelser aldri mer skulle skje, uavhengig av hvilket land/rike/by/religion det er snakk om.

[Jeg takker wikipedia og har antatt at de ikke vil ha noen innvendinger mot at jeg deler ovennevnte ekstrakt (er) fra nettstedet deres på dette innlegget, som er fritt synlig for alle, og ikke har noe økonomisk overskuddsmotiv overhodet.]


Hvorfor hadde russerne våpen mot slutten av det mongolske åket, men ikke mongolene? - Historie

William Weir -tiden er en MP dell'esercito e successivamente ha prestato servizio
come corrispondente di combattimento dell'esercito nella 25. infanteri
Divisjon durante la guerra coreana. Era un reporter di vari giornali nel
Missouri og Kansas, og redattore militare del Topeka State Journal. Ha scitto
circa 50 articoli, molti di loro su storia militare e sugli armamenti.
Ha scritto altri quattro libri:
Legendariske amerikanske skuddvekslinger og skytterfly,
Fatal Seire,
I Shadow of the Dope Fiend og A Well Regulated Militia:
Slaget om våpenkontroll.

Ma l'argomento sul quale (possibilmente) discutere è la classifica
che ha stilato nel suo libro che ha come titolo quello i oggetto.
Ovviamente bisogna avere un buona preparazione su tutte le
battaglie combattute sulla faccia della terra :-)))

1. Maraton, 490 f.Kr.
2. Nika Rebellion, 532 e.Kr.
3. Bunker Hill, 1775 e.Kr.
4. Arbela, 331 f.Kr.
5. Hattin, 1187 e.Kr.
6. Diu, 1509 e.Kr.
7. Storbritannia, 1940 e.Kr.
8. Konstantinopel, del 1, 1205 e.Kr.
9. Tsushima, 1905 e.Kr.
10. Saratoga, 1777 e.Kr.
11. Valmy, 1782 e.Kr.
12. Adrianopel, 378 e.Kr.
13. Midtveis, 1942 e.Kr.
14. Hastings, 1066 e.Kr.
15. Tenochtitlan, 1520-21 e.Kr.
16. Stalingrad, 1942-43 e.Kr.
17. Busta Gallorum, 552 e.Kr.
18. Lechfeld, 955 e.Kr.
19. Dublin, 1916 e.Kr.
20. Emmaus, 166 f.Kr.
21. Yarmuk, 636AD
22. Batte of the Atlantic, 1939-45 e.Kr.
23. Cannae, 216 f.Kr.
24. Malplaquet, 1709AD
25. Carrhae, 53 f.Kr.
26. Konstantinopel, del 2, 1453 e.Kr.
27. Armada, 1588 e.Kr.
28. TheMarne, 1914 e.Kr.
29. Rhodos, 1522 e.Kr.
30. Turer, 732 e.Kr.
31. Tanga, 1914 e.Kr.
32. Chalons, 451 e.Kr.
33. Las Navas de Toloso, 1212 e.Kr.
34. Gupta, 1180 e.Kr.
35. Chickamauga, 1863 e.Kr.
36. Lepanto, 1571 e.Kr.
37. New Orleans, 1814 e.Kr.
38. Petrograd, 1917 e.Kr.
39. Frankrike, 1918 e.Kr.
40. Alamo, 1836 e.Kr.
41. Wu-sung, 1862 e.Kr.
42. Waterloo, 1815 e.Kr.
43. Kadisiyah, 637 e.Kr.
44. Kazan, 1552 e.Kr.
45. Lutzen, 1632 e.Kr.
46. ​​Manila Bay, 1898 e.Kr.
47. Tet Offensive, 1968 e.Kr.
48. Roma, 390 f.Kr.
49. Sedan, 1870 e.Kr.
50. Poltava, 1709 e.Kr.

Smonto pezzo -pezzo il libro - considerando di essere un fortunato
ad averlo - e che ci sono user che ne vorrebbero sapere di più.
Eccoti la prefazione. Ad altri che hanno chiesto verrà dato nel limi
te delle mie possibilità di tempo.
Ethvert forsøk på å liste de 50 viktigste slagene i hele historien er
nødvendigvis subjektiv. Å liste dem i viktighetsrekkefølge er en jevn
større trening av chutzpah. Nevertheless, people have been listing
decisive battles since Sir Edward Creasy, a lawyer who taught history, a
century-and-a-half ago.
Other compilers include General J.F.C. Fuller, a professional soldier
Captain B.H. Liddell Hart, who was gassed and injured early in his career
and had to leave the army - he then became a journalist, and Fletcher Pratt,
who was a writer by trade. Each brings a distinctive flavor to the
enterprise.
Fuller is very strong on battles that were fought on land. He's less
interested in sea power and far less interested in air power.
Liddell Hart emphasizes his strategic theory - the superiority of
the indirect approach. He, and to some extent Fuller, preaches the gospel of
small, highly trained armies rather than the mass armies we've had in every
major war since those of the French Revolution.
Pratt's The Battles that Changed History has the distinct tang of
salty air, although most of the early battles it covers were fought on land.
Pratt also has the most openly Occidental orientation.
"[Ojne of the most striking features of Western European culture", he
writes, "has been its ability to achieve decisive results by military means.
It may even be the critical factor, the reason why that culture has
encircled the world. Not that the Far East and Africa have been lacking
in great battles or great victories, but their results have had less
permanent effect on the stream of world history."
It might be hard to convince a Russian that the victories of Genghis Khan
and the consequent subjugation and isolation of his country for three
centuries didn't have much effect on the stream of history.
Considering that the Mongol conquests brought such Chinese innovations
as cheap paper, movable type, the astrolabe, and gunpowder to Europe,
it might be difficult to convince anyone else, either.
In this book, I've attempted to avoid this kind of bias. But it's necessary
to consider who we are and where we are. What's important to this author -
an American living at the juncture of the 20th and 21st centuries - and to
his audience would probably not be important to a Chinese person in the
13th century.
It's been fairly easy to avoid a bias in favor of any particular military
nærme seg. I'm the son of a career U.S. Navy officer and the father of a
career U.S. Air Force officer, but I'm a dedicated civilian. Service
as an army combat correspondent and regimental public information
NCO in the Korean War gave me a slightly broader picture
than most GIs get, but the main thing I learned was when to keep my
head down.
Some of the military in my upbringing may have rubbed off, though.
Large proportions of the articles I've written have concerned military
history and weapons.
Of my four previous books, one, Fatal Victories, was entirely military
history.
Another, Written
With Lead, was about legendary American gunfights, including such military
events as the Battle of Saratoga and Custer's last stand. Still another, A
Vi vil
Regulated Militia, detailed the history of the American militia.
- Every battle has some effect on history. How do you decide which
had the most?
- The basic criteria for picking the importance of the battles that
changed the world are:
- How big a change did the battle make, and how much does that change
affect us?
One way is to decide what's really important to us and how did we get to
enjoy it. Most people would put freedom and democracy high on any
list of desirable things.
Consequently, Marathon, which preserved the world's first democracy,
holds the number-one spot. Order, not anarchy, is also highly desirable.
Justinian, Narses and Belisarius, by crushing the Nika revolt, made the
world's most widely used code of law possible. Bunker Hill, and to a
slightly l
ess extent, Saratoga, ensured the independence of the United States.
So, in a much less direct way, did Jackson's victory at
New Orleans. The Allied victories in World War II, particularly the Battle
of Britain, were the latest battles to guarantee democracy.
Another approach is to look at the currents of history. The ancient Greeks
saw history, to a large extent, as a record of the conflict between East and
Vest. That is certainly a viable idea. There are, in a very general sense,
two cultures in the world - Western and Eastern. The former would include
ev erything from the Orthodoxinfluenced
culture of Russia to the secular culture of the United States. The latter
would include the Far Eastern culture of China and Japan, both deeply
non-Western in spite of a Western veneer, and a wide variety of other
cultures, many of them Islamic. Neither the East nor the West has managed
to absorb the other, but it wasn't for want of trying.
This struggle, too, goes back to Marathon. It continues
through Alexander, Crassus and the seemingly interminable conflicts
between Christianity and Islam.
The West has been unable to absorb the East, but it certainly was able
to dominate it. There are a string of decisive battles that helped bring
that about. At Diu on the Indian Ocean, Portuguese sailors destroyed
a Muslim fleet in 1509. That crippled the thriving Arab trade with India
og Kina. Dar es Islam began to shrink economically.
Ten years later, Hernan Cortes landed in Mexico. Two years
after that, he had conquered - for the first time since Alexander -
a non-European empire, which opened a trade route to the
Far East across the Pacific. Russia's conquest of Kazan in
1552 initiated European expansion overland to the Far East. A generation
later, the defeat of the Spanish Armada energized the English to push west
across the Atlantic and conquer North America.
The latest trend in world history seems to be that the Western political
domination of the world is ending. In 1940, there was only one
independent country in Africa. Europeans owned the rest of the continent.
Today there are no colonies in Africa. Most of Asia and the
Far Eastern islands, except, China, Japan, and Japan's
colony, Korea, were also owned by Westerners. Today none of it is. In a way,
the battles of the American Revolution started the trend. De forente stater
became the first independent country in the New World. The rest of the
Americas followed.
In 1905, Togo's Japanese showed that non-Caucasians equipped with modern
technology could beat Caucasians equipped with comparable technology. I
1914, von Lettow Vorbeck's black African soldiers proved that, man for man,
they were the equal of Caucasians. But none of the colonial countries could
field the military equipment the Japanese could. It took a European country,
Ireland, to demonstrate how a weak nation could win its independence from a
strong one.
History is full of odd twists like that.

Per così poco non mi tiro indietro: mi piacciono post lunghi:-)))

The crushing defeat of Muslim forces at Tours (see page 170) in 732 was one
of the first of a whole string of disasters for the followers of Mohammed.
Chinese-led Uighur Turks had defeated the Arabs in 730 at Samarkand
and again in 736 at Kashgar. At the same time (731-732), Khazar
Turks invaded Arab lands through the Caucasus and got as far as
Mesopotamia before being pushed back. And in spite of years of trying,
the Muslim Arabs could make no more headway against the
Eastern Roman Empire.
In a century, the Arabs had conquered the largest empire the world had ever
sett. Now, internal stresses as well as external enemies had stopped the
empire's explosive growth.
In spite of what they professed- the brotherhood of all believers - the
empire was an Arab, not a Muslim, empire. Arabs held the highest
positions in both civil and military affairs. In the middle of the eighth
century, descendants of Mohammed's uncle, Abbas, led a revolt in
Central Asia. Mainly ethnic Persians, the rebels overthrew
the Omayyad Caliph, who claimed descent from Mohammed's
son-in-law, Omar. They founded a new, Abbasid, Caliphate.
In Spain and North Africa (west of Egypt), in the area known as el Maghrib
(the West) the natives were also restless. The Libyan Desert separated el
Maghrib from the rest °f Dar es Islam. The Muslims in el Maghrib, mostly
African Berbers, had no more use for the Persians than they had for the
Arabs. They didn't recognize the Abbasid Caliph.
Instead, various Berber chieftains ruled small sections of the
countryside independently, while Arab leaders, who had settled in the
cities, ruled city-states.
Eventually the Berbers found another descendant of Omar and proclaimed
a new Omayyad Caliphate. The Omayyads adopted the Spanish city of
Cordoba as their capital.
The new Caliphs at first attempted to revive the holy war against the
Christians in northern Spain, but soon found other things to interest them.
Spain, long ruled by the Romans, was a more urban - and urbane -
place than Africa. The Arabs had brought their own poetry to the
country, along with the art and architecture they had picked up from
the Persians, and the science and mathematics they learned from
the Greeks, the Mesopotamians, and the Indians. The Visigoths had a
literature of their own and had adopted the old culture of Rome.
Under the Muslims, Christians and Jews had freedom to practice
their religions and were able to engage in the learned professions.
Many Jews came to Spain from less tolerant countries in
northern Europe. Before long, Muslim Spain was a center of
civilization, not only in Europe but in the whole Muslim world as well.
Writing, painting, architecture, science, and philosophy flourished in
Omayyad Spain.
In the other Spain, the tiny principalities of the North, there was less
civilization and a good deal less religious tolerance, especially for
Muslims who had stolen Christian land.

The Muslims had never conquered all of Spain. The northwest corner, Galicia,
was inhabited by dour Celts (called Gallegos by the Spanish), who enjoyed
dour Celtic weather. The climate in foggy, rainy Galicia, on the shore of
de
Bay of Biscay, would have seemed perfectly normal to any Irishman or
Scotsman, but it was not inviting to the sun-baked sons of the desert.
Just east of the dour Gallegos were the dourer Basques. The Basques spoke
the same language their ancestors spoke in the Stone Age.
They had defied any attempts to assimilate them by Gauls, Romans, Visigoths,
and Franks. They were not going to let the Arabs and Berbers be the first to
conquer them.
There has long been a notion in the non-Spanish world that Christians from
France gradually pushed the Muslims back. The notion was probably started
and spread by the Franks. Any reader of Cervantes's masterpiece,
Don Quixote, knows that Charlemagne and his Franks were never pure heroes
to Spanish Christians. The Basques proved it by ambushing and wiping out
the rear guard of Charlemagne's army as it retreated through the pass at
Roncevalles. East of the Basques were the incipient kingdoms of Castile
and Aragon. And everywhere in that Christian fringe were dukes, counts,
and other warlords in more castles than you can count.
For a long time, there was no organized reconquista. There was no organized
anything in Christian Spain. The Spanish lords were not only jealous of each
other, but they contributed to the fragmentation of Christian Spain by
dividing their kingdoms up among their sons.
That situation might have resulted in further Muslim conquests if the Omyyad
Caliphate itself had not quickly fragmented into taifas, independent Berber
tribal states. In 1031, a council of taifa kings formally abolished the
caliphate.
There was a lot of raiding back and forth. Stealing from someone of the
other religion was not considered a sin by either the Christians or the
Muslims.
All warfare in Spain, however, was not Christians versus Muslims. Berber
chiefs attacked by other Berber chiefs enlisted Christians to help them.
Christian lords, in turn, had no qualms about seeking help from Muslims when
facing Christian enemies. The great Spanish hero of this age was Rodrigo
Diaz de Vivar, known as el Cid Campeador. His title is instructive.
"Cid" is a corruption of the Arabic "sidi," meaning lord. "Campeador," is
champion, a tide Christians gave their heroes.
A jealous Castilian king had exiled the Cid, so he offered his sword to the
Muslims.
He deserved his fame as a fighting man, triumphing on field after field. Men
nevertheless, the Christians were gradually pushing back the increasingly
fragmented Muslims. In 1085, the Castilians took Toledo, the old Visigoth
capital, now a major taifa capital.
Then, the taifa kings did something dangerous. They sought help from Africa,
which lost them the services of the Cid. Even worse from their point of
view, they lost their independence and the good life.

The Maghrib, and a good part of West Africa south of the Sahara, was under
the control of the Almoravids. While the Muslim rulers of Spain were sipping
wine,
watching dancing girls, and discussing philosophy, a Tuareg in the Sahara
was getting religion. Tuaregs are Berber nomads, people whose hardscrabble
life defies comparison.
"Tuareg" is an Arabic name (singular: Targui). It means "the forsaken of
God," as "Berber," which is Arabic from Greek, means "barbarian." Tuaregs
ran the caravans that crossed the desert. One of them, Yana ibn Omar,
saw how different life in the Arab cities was from his own existence, in
which a pool of clear water was an almost unimaginable luxury.
The Muslims of his time, he concluded, were corrupting
Islam. Luxury was turning them from God. To set things right, he led an
army of Tuaregs against the west African oases, then against the cities
of the north. He then founded a dynasty, called the Almoravids.
The Almoravids quickly conquered all the Maghrib and extended their
dominion to the black empires of the Sudan. When the Spanish Muslims
called on it, the Almoravid Empire was the most powerful Muslim state
i verden.
These African puritans took one look at what life was like in Spain and
saw that they had a double task: They must not only drive back the
infidels, but they must reform their erring brethren as well. An Almoravid
Spain had no attraction for the Cid, who went back to fight for the
Christians.
With him went thousands of Mozarabs, as Christians in the Muslim
area were called, and Jews. Barbarians, like the Tuaregs, and
later the Turks, had no idea why the Prophet made exceptions for the
"people of the Book."
The Castilian king again exiled the Cid, but this time Rodrigo did not
return to the Muslim lands. He raised a private army of both Christians
and Muslims and carved out a kingdom for himself. For the rest of his life,
he was King of Valencia.
When the Cid died, the Almoravids retook Valencia and quite a bit more.
But the warriors from the Sahara quickly succumbed to the fleshpots of
Al Andulus, as the Muslims called Spain. Once again the back-and-forth
raiding resumed and, thanks to the emigration from Muslim Spain,
Christian Spain gained manpower, civilization, and even an approach to
unity. Reconquista was now a definite Christian aim.
Once again, a Muslim prophet appeared in the backwoods. This time it
was Abu Mohammed ibn Tumari, a lamplighter's son in the Atlas Mountains.
He began preaching against luxury and soon converted a man who had
a natural talent for military leadership, Abd el Mumin. Abd el Mumin
raised an army and took over leadership of the movement.
By 1149, he had made himself Emir of Morocco. He founded a new
dynasty, the Almohades, and when he died in 1163, he was emperor
of a larger territory than the Almoravids held. Apparently
unable to learn from experience, once again, a taifa king invited the
African reformers to come to Spain and save his people.
They came they saw they conquered. By 1172, they controlled
all of Al Andulus, and their first order of business was to wipe out the
licentiousness of their co-religionists. The Almohades did not succumb
to the fleshpots. They kept their capital in the Atlas Mountains.
But by 1195 they were ready to take on the infidels.
The Almohades' Emperor Ya'cub gathered an army of Islamic troops
from all over Africa and Spain to march against Castile, the largest
and most aggressive of the Christian Spanish states.

Alfonso the Lucky
At the time Castile was ruled by Alfonso VIII, nicknamed the Lucky.
After his first meeting with Ya'cub's army, he was lucky to be alive.
The Muslims routed the Christians, and Alfonso made a humiliating
peace with Ya'cub. He was lucky to be able to sign a peace treaty.
One lucky break was that the old Almohade emperor knew he was
dying and wanted to go back to his beloved mountains to die.
The other was the result of an earlier stroke of luck, when Alfonso
of Castile was able to marry bis daughter to Alfonso of Aragon.
The King of Aragon died near the time of the battle.
His crown went to his son, Pedro II, grandson of Alfonso of Castile.
Aragon, on the Mediterranean shore, was a relatively powerful
Spanish state, and Pedro was famed as a knight-errant.
Continuing the campaign against both Castile and Aragon
would take more energy that old Ya'cub wanted to expend.
About this time, an idea originating in the Holy Land came to Spain.
The military monks founded in Outremer, the Knights of St. John
and the Knights Templars (see Rhodes and Malta, page 161),
inspired three orders of Spanish monks: the Knights of Calatrava,
the Knights of Alcantara, and the Knights of St. James. Som
their crusader counterparts, the Spanish orders were brave,
disciplined, and very professional soldiers.
Spain had not seen a disciplined military force since the Corps of
Slaves, mameluks maintained by the Caliphs, had been disbanded.
Ya'cub finally died in 1199. His son, Mohammed al Nazir, never
liked the peace with the Christians and he saw with apprehension that
Castile was growing stronger.
Alfonso, on his part, felt ready to challenge the Muslims again.
He denounced the treaty, and Mohammed al Nazir declared a holy war.
The Spanish Christians countered with a holy war of their own.
The Archbishop of Toledo persuaded the Pope to declare a crusade
against the Muslims in Spain. Both sides began recruiting wildly.
At that moment the Muslim world was relatively peaceful. Mohammed
al Nazir was able to recruit unemployed soldiers from as far east as
Persia and Turkestan and as far south as Nubia, on the upper Nile.
Alfonso's agents toured the courts of Europe and picked up a horde
of knights and men at arms. Most of both armies were cavalry.
The Christian strength, as always, was heavy cavalry - mailed horsemen
expert with the lance and sword. Muslim strength was in light cavalry -
horse archers and javelin men wearing less armor than their enemies
but more mobile.
Sancho cuts the chain
Al Nazir's plan was to draw his enemies away from their bases and
confront them with a strong position they couldn't break through.
Soon, their supplies would run out.
Logistics were not well developed in the Middle Ages. They'd have
to retreat, which would mean they'd scatter, making them an easy
prey for his agile horsemen.
He fortified the passes of the Sierra Morena Mountains, a little north of
the Guadalquivir River and Cordova, and waited. When Alfonso's allies,
his grandson, King Pedro of Aragon, and King Sancho the Strong of
Navarre, saw the situation, they advised Alfonso to retreat, but Alfonso
wanted to go on.
Then a shepherd appeared and showed the Christians an unguarded path around
the passes. The knights made their way over the path and suddenly appeared
on the heights above the Muslim army. Al Nazir's main body was located on
some small plains in the midst of hills, a geographical feature called
"navas" in Spanish.
Mohammed al Nazir's luring of the Christian army far away from its bases was
a smart strategy, as was confronting it with the fortified passes, but
keeping the bulk of his forces on the navas was not.
The small plains didn't provide enough
room for his light horse to operate effectively. But the navas were perfect
ground for the bonecrushing charges and hand-to-hand melees that were the
Christians' most effective tactics. Even so, the size of the Muslim army was
so great the Christians spent two days in prayer before they even moved.
The Muslim army was a great mass. In the center was Mohammed al Nazir.
The Emperor stood under a large parasol that served as a standard and
behind a stockade of logs bound together with a chain. He held a sword in
one hand and a Koran in the other. Around him on all sides was a bodyguard
of picked troops. El Nazir was no Alexander the Great, riding at the head
of his cavalry striking force. On the other hand, he was in the line of
battle-a position no modern head of state or even commanding general
would ever find himself in.
The Christian army was divided into the customary three "battles." Alfonso
commanded the center Pedro of Aragon commanded the left Sancho the
Strong commanded the right. The Christians charged. It was their kind of
battle: a wild, handto-hand brawl. But there were so many Muslims.
It was the largest Muslim army ever seen in Europe, the largest Muslim
army that would ever be seen in Europe for centuries hence.
The wings commanded by Pedro and Sancho slowly pushed the Muslims
into the rocky, wooded hills behind them, where they would lose all their
mobility. But in the center, the Muslims, fighting under the eye of the
Emperor, drove back the Christians.
The Knights of Calatrava were almost wiped out.
"Archbishop, it is here that we ought to die!" Alfonso yelled to the
Archbishop of Toledo as he rushed forward.
"No, sire, it is here that we should live and conquer," the churchman
replied. He pointed out that the Muslim horsemen had been stopped by
Alfonso's infantry spearmen, and the Knights of St. James were slashing
into their flank.
Alfonso's standard, following the King, pressed forward. The Muslims slowly
fell back. But it was Sancho the Strong, not Alfonso, who reached the
stockade first.
Sancho demonstrated why he had his nickname. He chopped through the chain
stockade and burst into Al Nazir's bodyguard. The royal parasol, sheltering
the Emperor from the sun, went down.
"Shah mat," Persian chess players used to say, the origin of our
"checkmate."
"The king is dead," meaning the game is over. At the Navas of Toloso, the
game was over. The Muslim army panicked and tried to flee. De fleste av dem
didn't get far. The slaughter was terrific.
It almost wiped out the warrior aristocracy not only
of Muslim Spain but also of North Africa. The losses hurt Egypt and Arabia
and were felt as far as Central Asia.
The aftermath of such a horrendous battle seemed incongruous. Den kristne
army took a few towns and castles and went home. Pedro of Aragon was killed
in battle the next year, Alfonso of Castile died a year later, and Christian
Spain went back to its intracommunal feuding.
The Muslim threat was over. The Almohade Empire in both Spain and Africa
began to fall apart immediately. It was extinct 50 years after the battle.
The Muslim taifa states paid tribute to the Christian kings.
Most importantly, the Christians held the central plateau of Spain,
containing the headwaters of all the Spanish rivers and
the intersections of all the roads. Geography had always been a strong force
against centralization in Spain. That obstacle was now removed.
The Muslim states slowly were wiped out until only Grenada, in the
far south, remained. Less than three centuries after the fight on the
Navas of Toloso, Isabella of Castile married Ferdinand of Aragon,
and Spanish unity was almost achieved.
Ferdinand and Isabella then invaded Grenada and drove the last Muslim
ruler out of Spain.
That was in 1492. The Spanish then looked for new worlds to conquer.
They found them across the Atlantic.


Oversikt

War and History

Can we characterize the strategies that defined war on the Eurasian continent from the steppes of North Asia to the Mediterranean in the south over the long period from the fifth century B.C.E. to the fifteenth century C.E.?

From the fourth century B.C.E. until the eighteenth century C.E., China was always coveted by the nomads on its northern border. Chinese civilization, which developed around the Yellow River during the third millennium B.C.E., was already the object of northern nomadic attacks even before Chinese unification (221 B.C.E.). Under the Han dynasty (206 B.C.E. to 219 C.E.), the focus of Chinese culture was north-central China, with the Yangtze Valley as its southern border. Progressively, China extended south under the Tang dynasty (618–907), but it was only under the Song dynasty (960–1279) that the Yangtze Valley came to dominate China both demographically and economically. China’s southern frontier region was one of expansion, where Chinese colonizers found fertile lands, inhabited by sedentary populations less advanced than themselves. In the north, however, although the steppe could be farmed, nomadic warriors stood ready to attack. As a result, China’s northern frontier was generally a line of defense, as illustrated by the beginning of the Great Wall shortly after unification, which was not completed until the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). Before the nomad Manchu Qing dynasty (1644–1911), Chinese territorial expansion to the north and northwest occurred under the Han and the Tang dynasties. Their goal was to control the northwestern oases of the Silk Road and establish a buffer zone between China and the northern nomads.

Until the Tang period, soldiers retained high prestige in Chinese society. Subsequently, however, the Confucian scholar became the favored role model, particularly after the tenth century, when mandarin competitions were instituted to select bureaucrats according to merit. Soon thereafter, the mandarins, rather than battle-hardened generals, were in control of Chinese military strategy.

From the fourth century on, northern China was constantly harassed and often occupied by nomads. Indeed, the occupation of northern China by nomadic peoples is a recurrent feature of Chinese history. All of China was, in fact, occupied twice by nomad dynasties, both coming from the north: the Mongol Yuan (1279–1368) and the Manchu Qing (1644–1911). The nomad invasions involved relatively small armies, however, which became sinicized within a few generations and were demographically diluted by the immense Chinese population—culture and demography have been China’s great assets throughout its history. Nonetheless, the sinicization of the occupiers did not change the geostrategy of the Chinese Empire or diminish its vulnerability in the north.

In order to rule northern China, the nomads needed to control the Ordos Desert, encircled by the rectangular bend of the Yellow River, which flows for more than four hundred miles into the Mongolian steppe. When well led and facing weak Chinese dynasties, nomads effectively dominated the Ordos for fifteen hundred of the two and a half thousand years of Chinese imperial history. Often the nomads would raid settled regions, and occasionally they would conquer northern China and capture its capital cities, Xian, Chang An, or Lo-Yang. However, whenever a great dynasty arose in China, it would take the offensive again with the goal of controlling the oases in the north and west along the Silk Road as far as the Tien Chan Mountains and Dzungaria (northern Xinjiang). This happened under the Han (202 B.C.E. to 220 C.E.), the Tang (618–902), and at the beginning of the Ming (1368–1644) dynasties. The Chinese attacked in early spring, when the nomads’ horses were still poorly nourished.

The Ming Empire underwent two distinct periods. The first, offensive, aimed at restoring Chinese imperial greatness. During this period, the Chinese imperial fleet reached as far as East Africa, at a time when the Portuguese had barely reached the southern coast of Morocco. However, beginning in the latter half of the Ming era, in the late fifteenth century, the empire isolated itself behind the Great Wall, and China’s coasts were abandoned to Japanese pirates.

After its conquest by the nomad Manchus in 1644, China returned to an expansionist policy. Under the sinicized Kangxi Emperor (1661–1722), the Manchus expanded to the north, crushing the troublesome nomads of Dzungaria. By the end of the eighteenth century the nomad peril had vanished. However, in the nineteenth century, the advance of Russia and the rise of European imperialism would present a far more serious threat to China.

Persia was another favorite target of the Central Asian nomads. In that respect, Persia and China faced similar challenges. The nomadic populations of Central Asia were concentrated around the northern part of the Oxus River—known today as the Amu Dar’ya, which flows fifteen hundred miles northwest from Afghanistan and Tajikistan to the Aral Sea. The first nomads to occupy this area were the Scythians. Herodotus relates that in the fifth century B.C.E., the Persian Great King Darius organized a campaign against them, which failed: the Scythians’ scorched-earth tactics weakened the army of the Achaemenid Empire, forcing Darius to retreat.

Indo-European nomads occupied the northern part of the Oxus from the seventh century B.C.E. to the third century C.E. and spread as far as the Ukrainian steppes. By the sixth century, the Central Asian steppes fell under the domination of Turkic tribes. By the tenth century, in Book of Kings (Shahnameh), the Persian poet Firdawsī identifies the Touran, that is to say, the turcophones, as Persia’s greatest enemies. Meanwhile, in the west, after the fall of the Achaemenid dynasty (550 to 330 B.C.E.), Persia successively confronted the Roman Empire and the Byzantine Empire. Finally, the Arabs put an end to the Persian Sassanid dynasty in 642 C.E.

Afghanistan to the east was never powerful enough really to dominate Persia. It was from the north that Persia was most vulnerable to invasions. The most serious threat came from the Turks beginning in the tenth century. Like the Chinese, the Persians had a civilizing influence on the turcophone nomads. From the eleventh to the end of the twelfth century, Persia was ruled by the Seljuk Turks, whose great vizier Nizam Al-Mulk (1018–92) was, however, a Persian.

Although Persia never had a population as huge as China’s, it also culturally assimilated its conquerors. For example, the Arab Abbasid dynasty, which arose in Baghdad after the decline of the Arab Umayyad dynasty centered in Damascus, was gradually influenced by Persian culture. Shiism, which was adopted by the Safavid dynasty at the beginning of the sixteenth century, led Persia further to differentiate itself from the Sunni Arabs and Ottoman Turks.

The French historian René Grousset called Persia the real middle kingdom. Every powerful dynasty that ruled Persia—Achaemenids, Sassanids (224–642 C.E.), Abbasids (750–945), and Safavids (1502–1722)—dominated Central Asia from Samarkand to the Indus. For almost a thousand years before the nineteenth century, Persian was thus the lingua franca of an area extending from Samarkand and Bukhara to Delhi and Agra. Persian influences are also seen in Central Asian architecture, with its emphasis on elegant gardens, and in cooking techniques that are widely shared from Central Asia to the Punjab.

The Indian subcontinent is geographically protected by oceans on two sides and by the Himalayas. Until the early modern European incursions, India was always invaded from the northwest. The history of the Indus Valley’s Harappan civilization goes back to the third millennium B.C.E., as witnessed by the remains of the city of Mohenjo-Daro, in today’s Pakistan. The Aryan invasion (1800–1500 B.C.E.) marked the beginning of a long succession of invasions, including that of the Hephthalite (or White) Huns in the fourth century B.C.E. This was followed by the great indigenous Indian dynasty of the Maurya (325 to 180 B.C.E.), which produced the remarkable emperor Aśoka the Great (273 to 232 B.C.E.). In his youth, Aśoka was a brilliant military commander, but he later became a devout Buddhist and promulgated laws banning hunting and ending forced labor. The Maurya Empire reached its greatest extent during this period, covering the entire Indian subcontinent and extending to the eastern part of present-day Afghanistan. Later, India would be ruled by another great indigenous state, the Gupta Empire (320 to 550 C.E.).

However, India prior to the modern era knew only one period when it was ruled from a single capital city, that of the Maurya Empire under Aśoka. Throughout its history, Indian unity has been less political than cultural. During most of its history, India was divided in multiple kingdoms, except when it fell under a foreign domination, as during the rule of Sultan Alauddin Khilji (1296–1316), the Mughal Empire under Aurangzeb (1659–1717), and finally under the British.

As early as the tenth century, northern India and, progressively, all of India except the Tamil extreme south fell under Muslim domination. In 1526, Babur, a turcophone fleeing Samarkand following an attack by Uzbeks, set out to conquer India using his artillery. After crossing the northwestern mountains and deserts, he waged battle on the plain of Delhi like the conquerors before him and won because he had cannons. He was victorious at Panipat despite his smaller army. It is interesting to note that the Delhi plain played the same historical role in India as Adrianople in the history of the Byzantine Empire: it was a place where geography and history met.

Unlike that of China, the political influence of India never extended much beyond its borders. However, the cultural influences of both China and India were widespread. East Asia became sinicized, reflecting the Chinese occupation of Korea until the fourth century, and of Vietnam until the tenth century, as well as the indirect influence of China on Japan through Korea, from the fourth century until the fall of the Tang dynasty (907). Similarly, Buddhism, born in India but gradually expelled by it, exerted a considerable influence on Southeast and East Asia beginning in the second century. Thus, India influenced Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Indonesia, which would later become Muslim, thanks to the peaceful proselytizing of Muslim merchants.

The Buddhist influence also reached Afghanistan (Gandhara), China, Korea, and Japan, and, in the seventh century, Tibet. The Mongol Yuan dynasty (1260–1370) converted to Buddhism, and Buddhism spread to Mongolia in the fourteenth century. Indian influences are also reflected in the magnificent temple architecture of Pagan in Burma, Borobudur in Java, and Angkor in Cambodia. India was twice subjugated by Muslims and then by Europeans. However, rural India entrenched itself in traditional Hinduism. The Islamic influence was felt most strongly in the north—in eastern Bengal and the northwest.

All nomadic invasions of India, like those of the White Huns and those led by sons of the steppe like the Ghaznavids and Babur, had to cross the same northwestern mountain passes, including the Khyber, and the deserts of Baluchistan before reaching the edge of the Indo-Gangetic plain. It is no surprise that the most warlike populations of the subcontinent, Sikhs, Punjabis, Marathis, and Rajasthanis, are concentrated in the northwest of the country, where conquerors came in droves. Bengal, on the other hand, which was better protected geographically, is known as a province of artists and poets. It was conquered from the sea by the British in the second part of the eighteenth century.

The border between Anatolia and Iran has changed little throughout two millennia, except when a single empire dominated the whole of Asia Minor from Central Asia to northern India. The border that separated the Roman Empire and the Parthians, the Byzantine Empire and the Sassanids, and the Ottomans and the Safavids resembles the border that today separates Turkey and Iran. Armenia has long been a buffer state that hangs in the balance between rival powers seeking alliance or allegiance. Because the power that controlled Anatolia was blocked in the east by the Persians, geostrategic logic forced it to advance toward the Balkans. The strategic key to this expansion is Edirne, previously called Adrianople. The other possible area for expansion is the Syrian-Palestinian corridor to the south. If the circumstances were favorable and the Anatolian empire were powerful, it would dominate the totality of these eastern Mediterranean territories, as in the case of the Byzantine Empire and the Ottoman Empire.

Egypt, the gift of the Nile, needs to maintain control of the Upper Nile until the fourth cataract. During the colonial period, the British had wisely linked the fate of Sudan to that of Egypt, and accepting their separation after decolonization was an error on the part of the free officers Muhammad Naguib and Gamal Abdel Nasser. In 1953, in his manifesto Falsafat al-thawra (Philosophy of the Revolution), Nasser sketched a very ambitious plan of pan-Arab geopolitics. In practice, his short-lived alliances with Syria and Yemen were poorly conceived, and in the case of Yemen led to a disastrous conflict. It would have been better to have merged with Sudan and underpopulated Libya, whose oil reserves would have been very useful to Egypt.

Egypt is bordered in the west, east, and south by deserts. Thus, during the Old Kingdom and most of the Middle Kingdom—a period of some fifteen hundred years—Egypt was protected by its geography and the absence of powerful neighbors. The threat came from the northwest, where the Sinai Desert serves as a buffer, but was not sufficient to stop the Hyksos invasion. When possible, Egypt has always tried to secure control of the Syrian-Palestinian corridor, ideally as far as the Euphrates. The battles of Megiddo and Kadesh, the most ancient documented battles in history, were fought to control this corridor. Kadesh, fought between the Hittites and the Egyptians, led to a compromise. As for the small states in the Fertile Crescent, they were safe only when a strong power did not rule Asia Minor or Egypt.

The emergence of superior European armament and technology upset the traditional Eurasian balance of power during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Great Britain, an insular power, repeatedly opposed whatever continental power was dominant in Europe (Spain, France twice, and then Germany) by allying itself with other states concerned about the threat of hegemony. Today, the United States, protected by two oceans, faces no serious rivals. However, it was made brutally aware of its vulnerability on September 11, 2001.

WAR AND WEAPONRY IN HISTORY

Sedentarism, the transition from nomadic life to the first urban centers, began some four millennia B.C.E. in Mesopotamia, Egypt, the Indus Valley, and China in the vicinity of the Yellow River. Very early on, Mesopotamia and Egypt became centers of civilization. We know little about the wars of high antiquity, aside from the vestigial archaeological artifacts. The first documented battle in history is that of Megiddo, which occurred in Palestine in 1469 B.C.E.

The weapons of Mesopotamian and Egyptian antiquity were made of bronze. It was only in the second millennium B.C.E. that iron weapons were introduced, with their increased efficiency and durability. Shields and armor made of leather or metal offered little protection. The pike, of variable length, was the classic weapon of antiquity. Swords of varying length were also used, the shortest being the Roman glaive.

The dominant projectile weapon, from China to Europe and throughout Eurasia, was the bow and arrow, though slings and spear-throwers were also used. Nomadic societies developed advanced laminated bows made of multiple woods, with a double curve that provided greater range and more power. The nomads generally used two bows: a short one when mounted, and a long one when on the ground.


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